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Abstract 
Negli ultimi dieci anni il fenomeno della Sharing Economy ha visto coinvolti sempre più settori 
economici. Dai settori degli alloggi e dei trasporti, con il grande successo di Airbnb e Uber, a 
quelli della ristorazione, dei servizi domestici e molti altri, le piattaforme di condivisione online 
stanno influenzando vari ambiti economici offrendo soluzioni semplici e pratiche per molte 
situazioni quotidiane. L’evidenza del successo di questo nuovo modello economico risiede nel 
numero sempre crescente di utenti di queste piattaforme online. 
La Sharing Economy, oltre alla sua capacità di apportare soluzioni per situazioni quotidiane, 
sembra anche capace di ridurre uno dei fallimenti di mercato più frequente nei mercati 
tradizionali, ovvero le asimmetrie informative tra il consumatore e il venditore. Lo scopo di 
questo elaborato è, dunque, quello di analizzare se la Sharing Economy è in grado di ridurre 
queste asimmetrie informative attraverso il caso studio di listnride, una giovane piattaforma 
online che opera nel settore del bike-sharing.   
Prima di procedere con il caso studio, viene fatta una presentazione generale del fenomeno della 
Sharing Economy (Capitolo 1) dove vengono definiti le sue caratteristiche distintive, gli attori 
principali e i modelli di business utilizzati dalle piattaforme di condivisione online. Dopo di 
ciò, si procede con la definizione del problema delle asimmetrie informative nei mercati 
tradizionali e si espongono le soluzioni proposte delle piattaforme online (Capitolo 2); in 
particolare si analizzano i meccanismi reputazionali e di feedback implementati nelle 
piattaforme online per generare fiducia sia fra gli utenti che costituiscono le due parti dello 
scambio, sia fra gli utenti e la piattaforma. Da quest’analisi si deduce che, una misura valida 
per l’efficacia di questi meccanismi è il numero di transazioni che avvengono nella piattaforma. 
Infatti, per i business online la fiducia è un requisito fondamentale affinchè avvenga lo scambio 
tra le parti. In particolare, un aumento nel tempo del numero di transazioni indica un effetto 
positivo dei processi reputazionali e di feedback nel generare fiducia, e dunque nel ridurre le 
asimmetrie informative. 
Nel capitolo finale (Capitolo 3) si espone il caso studio di listnride. Questa giovane piattaforma 
online di bike-sharing possiede due caratteristiche peculiari che la distinguono dai classici 
servizi di bike-sharing e di noleggio biciclette online. La prima caratteristica è l’ampia offerta 
di bici, soprattutto bici da strada o da cross, bici elettriche, da carico o pieghevoli che 
difficilmente si trovano online disponibili per il noleggio a prezzi competitivi. La seconda 
caratteristica riguarda il portafoglio di servizi offerti da listnride che prevede un programma di 
“test-ride” dove i potenziali clienti hanno la possibilità di testare una bici prima di acquistarla. 
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E’ importante sottolineare questi due aspetti per non collegare il successo della piattaforma ad 
un fenomeno settoriale. Dopo la presentazione dei meccanismi reputazionali e di feedback 
utilizzati da listnride, vengono mostrati i noleggi per trimestre avvenuti nella piattaforma negli 
anni 2017 e 2018, tra i quali risulta un notevole aumento tra il 2017 e il 2018. Ciò suggerisce 
un effetto positivo dei processi reputazionali e di feedback nel ridurre le asimmetrie 
informative. 
In conclusione, come risulta del caso studio, la Sharing Economy è in grado di ridurre le 
asimmetrie informative tra venditore e consumatore. Non solo deve saper ridurre questo 
fallimento di mercato, la Sharing Economy deve anche considerare il superamento delle 
asimmetrie informative come un requisito fondamentale per generare business di successo. 
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Introduction: Sharing Economy in the Urban Society 
Do you need a cab? The chances are you click on your Uber or Blablacar app and book a ride 
rather than call or wait for a taxi. Are you looking for an accommodation for your holidays? 
Airbnb offers hundreds of different accommodations (from single rooms to entire houses) in 
almost any destination city in the world. The new Ikea shelving system you bought is too hard 
to put together? With TaskRabbit you can have someone at your door almost instantly, with a 
wrench in hand, ready to help you. Are you too tired to cook tonight?  You can book a dinner 
on Gnammo and try homemade food while getting to know new people.  
These examples are not a representation of the future. These are common situations from 
everyday life: transportation, accommodation, professional services, restaurants and many 
other industries have been radically changed by the Sharing Economy. A new economic model 
growing fast and reaching new economic sectors every day. Platforms like Airbnb and Uber 
have now become established businesses with high revenues and a strong brand identity in the 
accommodation and transportation services respectively. In 2017, over 100 million travellers 
chose Airbnb to find their accommodation and an average of more than 15 million rides per day 
were booked on Uber. These numbers show that the Sharing Economy has become a successful 
business model.  
These companies owe their success partly to the innovative solutions they offer to city life 
problems, and partly to the reduced transportation costs that normally incur in the exchange of 
goods or services between companies and consumers. As a matter of fact, the Sharing Economy 
found its success by offering innovative solutions to the challenges of life in crowded urban 
areas: it efficiently provides city residents with a range of goods and services that they would 
otherwise need to spend time and effort obtaining or doing on their own. The Sharing Economy 
has the potential to make urban workers more productive generally (Davidson and Infranca, 
2016).  
In particular, the Sharing Economy sees the anonymity of urban life as a source of competitive 
advantage and a market niche to develop. The Sharing Economy generates new social capital 
because in this business model people share human and physical resources at different levels of 
social and economic life. The people involved share creation, production, distribution, trade 
and consumption of goods and services with other people or organizations. This great level of 
sharing explains why mechanisms such as rating systems and online direct communication have 
become fundamental characteristics for Sharing Economy platforms: they are needed to build 
trust and create valuable markets, where people can feel secure enough to share goods and 
services with others. 
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An economic model based on sharing and trust is not something new in our society. In fact, a 
similar model was associated with the pre-urban communities. What is new is its application. 
The Sharing Economy provides efficient solutions not only to everyday situations (such as 
finding an accommodation for your holiday, a parking lot for your car, a ride to work or a pet-
sitter for your dog), but it also seems to provide a solution for a typical market failure in the 
traditional market: the asymmetric information between vendor and consumer.  
In this paper, I will analyse the Sharing Economy and its mechanisms to build trust, in order to 
discuss if it can actually provide a solution to the market failure of asymmetric information 
between the parties involved in an exchange. In particular, to discuss this point, I will develop 
a case study of listnride, an online bike-sharing platform from Berlin. First, I will give a 
definition of Sharing Economy and its key actors (Chapter 1) and present the problem of 
asymmetric information in the traditional market (Chapter 2), before proceeding with the case 
study (Chapter 3). 
 
 
Chapter 1: What is the Sharing Economy? 
1.1 A definition of Sharing Economy  
Before giving a definition of Sharing Economy, it is important to note that other terms are often 
used to express this concept. Some examples are: Access Economy, Collaborative 
Consumption, Collaborative Economy, Connected Consumption, Gift Economy, P2P 
Economy, Pay-As-You-Use Economy, Rental Economy, Reputation Economy, Shared 
Capitalism, Trust Economy, Uber Economy and many others. Overall, these terms all express 
the same concept of “Sharing Economy”, but they mainly focus on a specific aspect of this 
phenomenon. Due to the number of terms and definitions in use, defining the Sharing Economy 
is not as simple as defining other economic models. For this reason, I decided to present three 
different definitions that focus on different aspects of the Sharing Economy and derive from 
them a general definition for this new economic model. 
The first definition is the one given by the European Commission on its report about 
Collaborative Economy for the period 2013-2017 (European Commission, Single Market 
Scoreboard, Performance per Policy Area, Collaborative Economy, July 2018):  
“The Collaborative economy refers to business models where activities are facilitated by 
collaborative platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary usage of goods or 
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services often provided by private individuals. The collaborative economy involves three 
categories of actors: 
1. Service providers who share assets, resources, time and/or skills — these can be 
private individuals offering services on an occasional basis (“peers”) or service 
providers acting in their professional capacity (“professional service providers”). 
2. Users of these services. 
3. Intermediaries that connect – via an online platform – providers with users and that 
facilitate transactions between them (“collaborative platforms”).  
Collaborative economy transactions generally do not involve a change of ownership and can be 
carried out for profit or not-for-profit.” 
The second definition is given by Wikipedia (July 2018, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharing_economy ): “Sharing economy is an umbrella term with 
a range of meanings, often used to describe economic activity involving online transactions. 
Originally growing out of the open-source community to refer to peer-to-peer based sharing of 
access to goods and services, the term is now sometimes used in a broader sense to describe 
any sales transactions that are done via online market places, even ones that are business to 
business (B2B), rather than peer-to-peer. For this reason, the term sharing economy has been 
criticised as misleading, some arguing that even services that enable peer-to-peer exchange can 
be primarily profit-driven. However, many commentators assert that the term is still valid as a 
means of describing a generally more democratized marketplace, even when it's applied to a 
broader spectrum of services. Alternatively, collaborative consumption or the sharing economy 
refers rather to resource circulation systems which allow a consumer two-sided role, in which 
consumers may act as both providers of resources or receivers of resources. This vision allows 
for a broader understanding of the sharing economy on the overarching criteria of consumer 
changing role capacity.” 
The third definition is the one given by Alex Stephany, CEO of JustPark (an online platform 
to share parking lots in the UK), in his book The Business of Sharing Economy. Making it in 
the New Sharing Economy. “Sharing Economy is the value created when making under-utilised 
resources available online to a big community, reducing people’s need of owning these 
resources”. 
First of all, from these definitions, we can line out the three main characteristics of the Sharing 
Economy. The first characteristic is the kind of economic relationship established between the 
parties in the exchange: this relationship is mainly a C2C (consumer to consumer) or peer-to-
peer relationship. The second characteristic is the purpose of the relationship: the main aim of 
the exchange in the Sharing Economy is not the transfer of ownership stake, but rather the 
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temporary access to a specific good or service. The third characteristic is the object of the 
exchange, which can be a physical or non-physical good, a service or a specific knowledge 
owned by an individual: what counts the most is that often the asset is underutilised. 
Putting together these three main characteristics, it is possible to derive a fourth definition of 
the Sharing Economy. In general, this new economic model can be defined as: “The sharing 
economy enables a shift away from a culture where consumers own assets (from cars to drills), 
toward a culture where consumers share access to assets. This shift is driven by internet peer-
to-peer platforms which connect consumers and enable them to make more efficient use of 
underutilised assets. In this framing the sharing economy consists of peer-to-peer internet 
platforms (including Airbnb, Uber, TaskRabbit, Just Park...) which empower individuals to 
monetise their underutilised assets, time and skills” (Martin, December 2015).  
The above definition underlines an important aspect of the Sharing Economy. Its fundamental 
concept is to own less and have access to more. A noble idea, but sharing does not always mean 
caring, particularly if it is done for compensation and with total strangers (Ranchordas, 2015). 
So, after the definition of Sharing Economy, another point to define is why do people participate 
in the Sharing Economy and if they do so, is it because they care about others and want to share 
their goods or skills within the community they live in or not? 
 
1.2 Why people participate in the Sharing Economy 
Schor and Fitzmaurice (2014) in their study on the reasons why people participate in the Sharing 
Economy, found that there are three main motivations. The first is economic. Peer-to-peer 
online platforms are able to re-distribute value across the supply chain: they deliver more value 
to both consumers, reducing transportation costs and vendors, creating new earning 
opportunities. For example, in the homepage of Uber you can find this slogan as a reason to 
become an Uber Driver: “Drive when you want. Make what you need. Driving with Uber is 
flexible and rewarding, helping drivers meet their career and financial goals” (Uber, 
https://www.uber.com/en/de/). Moreover, users of online sharing platforms can be both 
consumers and sellers, increasing their value in both roles.  
A second reason for people to participate in the Sharing Economy is environmental. Most online 
sharing platforms advertise their green credentials and the lower impact they have on the 
environment, because instead of buying new goods, people exploit those that they already have 
as much as possible. Etsy, for example, an online sharing platform where people can sell and 
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buy accessories, clothes, toys, tools and much more, publishes a yearly report on their efforts 
to minimise environmental harm and maximise the benefit they create for people and the planet.  
The third reason why people register on online sharing platforms is to increase social connection 
and build social networks. This is also advertised by online sharing platforms themselves as a 
main feature of their businesses. Blablacar, for example, in the section “About us” of its 
website, talks about its social impact: “Carpooling creates a unique space, enabling exchanges 
between people who might have never met otherwise but who come together to share a ride”. 
(Blablacar, https://blog.blablacar.com/about-us)  
Schor and Fitzmaurice also found two other relevant aspects that persuade people to participate 
in the Sharing Economy. The first is “technophilia”, which by definition is the love or 
enthusiasm people have for advanced technology. People participate in the Sharing Economy 
because they like using the Internet to do things efficiently and easily. Think about Airbnb. 
Nowadays, if you want to rent your place for a short term, you can simply create a profile on 
their website, list your accommodation and just add a couple of nice pictures. Plus, you can do 
it comfortably from your sofa: all you need is a computer and an Internet connection. The 
sophisticated interfaces offered by many online sharing platforms are also part of the appeal. 
The second reason that enhances participation is a political and ideological factor. Schor and 
Fitzmaurice found out that many participants to their study are ideologically committed to the 
concepts of sharing and collaborating. In particular, many users seem to criticise the traditional 
market, considered as a scenario of impersonal exchanges between firms, that just try to make 
their products outdated before time, and people, who are constantly induced to consume more. 
In general, Schor and Fitzmaurice explain that for many participants, especially early adopters, 
joining sharing or swapping initiatives is an intentional political act with the purpose of helping 
to construct an alternative to the traditional market, a new market that produces personalized 
exchange relations. 
Whether their reason is of economic, environmental, social, political nature or comes from a 
love for technology, the number of people participating in the Sharing Economy is continuously 
increasing. Evidence lies in the number of users of online sharing platforms. For example, in 
2016 in Italy, 121 thousand people registered as hosts on Airbnb and 5,6 million people rented 
an accommodation. Although they represent a significant category, users of online sharing 
platforms are not the only stakeholders in the Sharing Economy.  I will present the most 
important key actors of the Sharing Economy in the next paragraph.  
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1.3 The Key Actors of the Sharing Economy 
The choice of definitions I presented in the paragraph 1.1 is not casual. In fact, the three 
definitions come from the three main actors involved in the Sharing Economy: users of online 
sharing platforms (represented by Wikipedia users), the online sharing platforms themselves 
(represented by the CEO of JustPark) and the regulatory authorities (represented by the 
European Commission).  
The first key actors in the Sharing Economy are the online sharing platforms. Conceived as 
peer-to-peer businesses through which people can sell or rent for short terms goods or services, 
online platforms have become the new marketplace of the Sharing Economy. They play the role 
of the intermediary in the transactions between their users. Their core business concept is based 
on the fact that they provide an easy and efficient solution for both parties in a transaction: 
people who are looking for a specific good or service and people who are offering their assets, 
time or knowledge. In this sense, online platforms can also be defined as producers. A 
characteristic most online platforms share is that they were born to give a solution to problems 
of everyday life. For example, Airbnb was born in 2007 from the idea of Brian Chesky, a 26-
years-old designer from San Francisco. Brian did not have enough money to pay the rent at that 
time, so during the annual reunion of the Association of Industrial Designers he offered 
mattresses and breakfast at his place to earn some money and called his initiative Air Bed and 
Breakfast. Another example is Taskrabbit, an online marketplace where people can find help 
for household duties. It was founded in 2008 by Leah Busque, a mathematician and programmer 
working for IBM in Boston. During a winter night, Leah and her husband were late for a dinner, 
when they found out that they had run out of food for their dog and could not find a solution 
that could make them both take part to the dinner and feed their pet: this was when Leah 
developed a first idea of the website. Kickstarter, an online platform to collect funding for 
creative projects, was born from the need of its founder Perry Chen to collect money for an 
event. In 2001, Perry was looking for funding to organise a musical event for the New Orleans 
Jazz Festival, but unfortunately, he could not find any support. It was from this episode that he 
realised the need for an online platform where artists could fund their projects, not from big 
investors but directly from their public. An interesting case is Gnammo, an Italian platform for 
social eating. Gnammo was first launched in Italy in 2012. Gian Luca Ranno had a first idea of 
this platform during a dinner with friends. All the participants complimented the cook and 
suggested him to open a restaurant, but he complained that opening a restaurant in Italy was too 
expensive and added that he liked to cook just in a few occasions, for friends or to meet new 
people. Listening to this conversation, Gian Luca started thinking about an online platform 
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where people could be cookers and offer dinners or lunches at their place and ask gnammers to 
participate in these events.  
All these examples are important because they proof that online sharing platforms are born to 
provide a solution to problems of everyday life, but also because they offer us an overview of 
the economic sectors the Sharing Economy can reach. Accommodation and transportation, with 
the great success of Airbnb and Uber, are not the only industries affected by the Sharing 
Economy. Even professional services with platforms such as Taskrabbit, have now found a new 
marketplace where they can have more demand and more supply. Financial services, with new 
platforms such as Kickstarter, have now reached a new dimension: the crowdfunding, which 
means that everyone can contribute in financing a project. And restaurant services too, thanks 
to platforms such as Gnammo, have now reached the new dimension of social eating, which 
values eating as a social activity and as a chance to meet new people. Especially in the case of 
restaurant services, but not limited to, online sharing platforms performing in already existing 
economic sectors shed light on an important issue: how to regulate these new businesses? 
Should they follow the same rules established for traditional businesses or should they follow 
new rules, specifically created for them? This topic introduces another key actor of the Sharing 
Economy: the regulatory authority. 
The introduction of a new economic model always implies the involvement of the regulatory 
authority. In particular, the relationship between law, regulation and innovation can have three 
outcomes. First, regulation can hinder innovation by placing excessive burdens on 
entrepreneurs. Second, law and regulation may facilitate the introduction of innovations in the 
market, notably by waiving requirements or the observance of standards, granting exemptions, 
or authorizing companies to develop novel activities and projects on a temporary or permanent 
basis. Third, regulation can have no direct effect on innovation and only accidentally foster it, 
since innovation might simply emerge “serendipitously” (Ranchordas, 2015). In the case of the 
Sharing Economy, the outcome of this relationship is not so clear. On the one hand, firms 
operating in the traditional market ask for specific laws that protect their status from potential 
new entrants on the market represented by online sharing platforms. In the opinion of the 
“traditional” firms, law and regulation should limit the activity of online sharing platforms. On 
the other hand, the success of online sharing platforms, that are registering an increasing number 
of users, persuades the regulatory authority to facilitate the introduction of this new economic 
model.  Therefore, regulating the Sharing Economy requires balancing different interests: state 
and local authorities and policy-makers must ensure that stakeholders in the Sharing Economy 
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and third parties are protected by the law. Due to these conflicting interests, the role of 
regulatory authority in the Sharing Economy is still not well defined.   
Finally, as mentioned earlier, one of the most significant key actors of the Sharing Economy is 
represented by the users of online sharing platforms. An important aspect to consider is that 
users on these platforms can be both entrepreneurs and consumers, according to their needs. In 
some cases, they don’t even need to specify their role at the time they register. For example, on 
Blablacar one can simply register on the platform as user and later decide to offer a ride to 
other users. Whether they register to offer goods or services or to enjoy them, it is interesting 
to analyse who these users are.  
Because the Internet and mobile devices constitute the main scenario where the Sharing 
Economy operates, it is not surprising that most users of online sharing platforms are young 
people. Statistics from the USA show that young people between 18 and 35 represent the 48% 
of online sharing platforms users. Adults between 36 and 54 represent the 33%, and the 55+ 
represent the 19% of the users. On the other hand, European statistics show that people between 
25 and 39 years-old are the 27% of users; younger people between 15 and 24 represent the 18%, 
adults between 40 and 54 years-old the 22% and the 55+ represent only 10% of the users (data 
from Vision Critical).  An interesting study conducted in 2016 in 28 European countries by 
TNS Political & Social Network tried to assess the awareness of the Sharing Economy among 
the population. Results show that more than half of the participants was aware of this 
phenomenon, and in particular 15% had already tried one of its services at least once. In general, 
younger users with higher education, labour income and living in urban areas are the most 
informed about the Sharing Economy they represented two thirds of the total number of 
participants to the study. One third within this category of participants to the study had also 
used an online sharing platform at least once. This study from TNS analysed the supply side as 
well. In Europe, more than one third of users who visited an online sharing platform, also 
offered a service in the same platform. More into detail, 10% of this subcategory offers a service 
once a year, 20% offers a service more than once a year and 5% offers a service regularly every 
month. 
I will now focus on Italian users of Sharing Economy platforms. A study conducted in October 
2015 by TNS Kantar, shows that 70% of Italians knows what Sharing Economy means. In 
particular, 45% knows the term Sharing Economy but never tried any online sharing service 
and 25% actually uses Sharing Economy-based services. Another interesting point of this 
survey is the analysis of what the 45% of Italians who never tried any Sharing Economy service 
thinks about this new phenomenon. Results show that 22% of them are willing to use Sharing 
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Economy platforms in the future, 18% would need more information and only 5% are not 
willing to use it in the future. The study looks further into the characteristics of the 25% of 
Italians who do use Sharing Economy services. Differently from the results of American and 
European statistics, in Italy the biggest percentage of online sharing platforms users is 
represented by adults between 35 and 44 years-old, as they make up 28% of the total users. 
Young people between 18 and 24 years-old represent the 22%, young adults between 25 and 
34 years-old the 24%, adults between 45 and 54 years-old the 17% and adults older than 55 
years-old make up only 9% of the total. From the Figure 1, it is clear that the number of Italian 
users in the Sharing Economy increased significantly from 2013 to 2015. This increase shows 
how the phenomenon of the Sharing Economy is spreading in Italy too and that online sharing 
platforms are intensifying their presence in this country. 
Figure 1: Italian users of the Sharing Economy 
 
(source: TNS Kantar, Study on Sharing Economy in Italy, 2015) 
 
To conclude, it seems clear that the majority of Sharing Economy users are young people 
between 20 and 35 years-old, who are usually more confident with the Internet and mobile 
devices and can use online sharing platforms more easily.  
 
 
14 
 
1.4 Different Business Models 
After the short introduction on the key actors of the Sharing Economy, it is important to analyse 
how these actors operate in the economic scenario. In particular, I will now present the different 
business models used by online sharing platforms to compete in a specific market and generate 
revenues.  
Before starting with a presentation of the different business models, it is important to introduce 
a fundamental characteristic of online sharing platforms: the trade-off between minimizing 
transaction costs for users (i.e. search and deliberation) and optimising the use of information 
to match the two potential sides of the exchange, vendors and consumers (Codagnone and 
Martens, 2016). Basically, what online sharing platforms do is trying to reduce the time that 
their users spend looking for a specific good or service or for potential customers, and 
optimising the information they get from users to help them find the ideal partner for the 
exchange. Online sharing platforms also try to find a compromise between reducing transaction 
costs and improving the use of information in presence of a high level of heterogeneity in the 
supply and consumer preferences. There are three categories that present the most heterogeneity 
in online sharing platforms: preferences of consumers; suppliers and consumers; the object of 
transaction. For example, TaskRabbit presents high heterogeneity in terms of users, requested 
tasks, skills and price offered by the suppliers. Costs and differences in tastes create a fair degree 
of heterogeneity for Airbnb. And this is the reason why the platform is designed in a fairly 
decentralised manner too, with little control over the key terms of the interaction between hosts 
and guests. Uber, instead, has a high heterogeneity in users only. In fact, it needs to match the 
driver and the customer in real time, especially in peak hours and, as a consequence, the type 
of car and the type of driver are probably less important factors than getting a ride at the right 
time. This led to a very centralised design of the platform and a high level of control over the 
key terms of the interaction.  
This core characteristic of online sharing platforms explains the origin of their business. These 
platforms generate revenue by providing a trade-off between minimizing transaction costs and 
optimizing the use of information. They charge money to their users for providing this service 
and this is how they grow their business. They charge their users in different ways, and for this 
reason the business models which online sharing platforms operate through are different. In the 
literature of the Sharing Economy, the main business models are five: service fee, subscription 
fee, membership plus usage, white label and two-sided market.  
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The first and most common business model used by online sharing platforms is the service fee. 
According to this model, the platform charges its users a fee by keeping a percentage from the 
monetary value of the exchange. The platform can decide to charge a fee only to one side of the 
transaction or to both. Gnammo, for example, charges only the consumers, who in this case are 
the gnammers booking a meal. Taskrabbit, on the contrary, charges the taskers, so the people 
who offer their time and skills. Airbnb instead, generates its revenue by charging both parties, 
the people who are renting their places, and the consumers, people who are looking for a short-
term accommodation.  
The second business model is the subscription fee. In this case, the platform charges its users a 
fixed subscription fee, which does not depend on the number of transactions made. An example 
of a platform that uses this business model is HomeExchange. HomeExchange is an online 
sharing platform where people can exchange their houses for a short time. After the registration, 
which includes a subscription fee of 130€, people can look for houses where they would like to 
spend a short time, and make a proposal to the owners of these houses. Before agreeing on the 
exchange, the platform allows the two parts to have a direct communication through an online 
chat integrated in the website and to organise a conference call on Skype (or other VoIP 
systems), so they can get to know each other. The model of the subscription fee can also have 
some variations. For example, a platform can decide to use the freemium model, which means 
that the basic services are free and users pay additional services only. Spotify is a great example 
of how the freemium model works: if people do not want advertisement to interrupt their 
playlists, they have to pay for the premium version. Another variation to the subscription model 
is the tiered subscription. In this case, the platform charges its users different prices for the 
membership depending on the level of usage that users have of its service. Netflix implements 
the tiered subscription business model: the more you want to have films and series available 
for you to watch, the more you have to pay.  
The third business model is the membership plus usage. This model requires that users pay a 
membership fee to have access to the service and in addition they pay every time they use the 
service. This model is typically used in car-sharing and bike-sharing platforms that provide 
their service in metropolitan areas. For example, BikeMi, a bike-sharing platform operating in 
the city of Milan, offers an annual or occasional membership fee to have access to the bikes and 
charges a fare depending on how much time the users ride the bikes.  
The fourth model is called white label. According to this model, the platform offers a paid 
service to institutions, organizations and firms and, with the revenue the platform generates, the 
service stays free for the consumers. An example of this business model is Timerepublik. 
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Timerepublik is an online sharing platform where people can offer their skills and knowledge 
for specific services in exchange of time credits. These time credits can be spent on the platform 
to receive some services from other users. In this sense, Timerepublik can also be considered 
as a social network. To keep the service free for the users, the platform licenses its brand to 
companies, institutions or associations that want to implement the commitment of their 
employees, citizens or associates.  
The last business model I will analyse is the two-sided market. Platforms that use this model 
offer a free service to their users, thanks to the revenue they generate selling advertising space 
on their website. This is the case of Couchsurfing. Couchsurfing is an online sharing platform 
where people can offer or get an accommodation for free. This is a classic example of “gift 
economy”: people in fact do not earn money and do not ask for a return. Couchsurfing’s motto 
is “Stay with locals and meet travellers”. Born as a non-profit platform, Couchsurfing had to 
change into a venture capital, but to keep its service free for users it sells advertising space on 
the website.  
The business models outlined above are the main models used by sharing platforms in the 
Sharing Economy. But there is another model worth mentioning: auction. The auction 
mechanism can also help in coping with the trade-off between transaction costs and efficient 
use of information. A master example of this model is eBay. eBay is an online platform where 
people can sell a wide range of goods, from home and garden accessories, to electronics, motors 
and much more. The sale system is auction: people sell their goods to the best bidder, and eBay 
charges the seller a fee based on the final value of the auction. Although eBay is a successful 
business, auctions can be difficult to carry out and time consuming. Auctions also imply a lot 
of effort from the platform in order to offer a good balance between reduced transactions costs 
and efficient use of information. For this reason, a decline in the number of digital platforms 
that use auction mechanisms has been detected, while there is an increasing number of 
platforms that adopt service fee or subscription fee as a business model instead. 
This chapter offered a general overview of the phenomenon of the Sharing Economy, presenting 
its key actors and main business models. In the next chapter, I will go deeper into the topic of 
asymmetric information and how the Sharing Economy can reduce this market failure. 
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Chapter 2: The problem of asymmetric information and 
the solution provided by the Sharing Economy 
2.1 The problem of asymmetric information 
Before starting with the analysis of the solutions provided by the Sharing Economy to this 
market failure, it is important to define the problem of asymmetric information and show which 
are its consequences in the traditional market. 
Asymmetric information, also known as information failure or market failure, occurs when one 
party of an economic transaction possesses greater information regarding the object of the 
transaction than the other party. This normally happens when the seller of a specific good or 
service has greater knowledge about it than the buyer. But the reverse case is also possible. A 
typical example is the stipulation of an insurance contract: the person who asks for a health 
insurance coverage knows his predisposition for specific illnesses better than the insurer. In 
general, almost all economic transactions are affected by asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information can lead to economic advantages and disadvantages. It drives to 
economic advantages and is considered a desired market outcome when the party who has 
greater information uses it to help the other party and improves the outcome of the transaction. 
An example can be a specialized worker who, thanks to his specialization, is more productive 
in his field and can provide greater value to workers in other fields. Think of a factory which 
produces using the system of assembly-line: if a worker in a specific point of the line is more 
productive thanks to his specialization, the whole line is more productive. Although asymmetric 
information can be a desired market outcome if used in a way that increases the value of a 
transaction’s outcome, it often takes to economic disadvantages. In facts, the party who has 
greater information usually exploits it in an undesirable or dishonest way. This can lead to two 
different consequences: the moral hazard and the adverse selection. 
Adverse selection occurs when, due to asymmetric information, one party of the transaction, 
usually the one who has less information, is driven to take less efficient economic decisions, 
such as doing more business with less-profitable or riskier market segments. A typical case of 
transaction affected by asymmetric information that leads to adverse selection is the case of the 
insurance contract. Insurers usually find that high-risk people are more willing to stipulate an 
insurance contract and pay higher premium policies. Hence, by increasing the premium 
policies, an insurance company has more money to pay benefits to its customers. But, at the 
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same time, people who have a less risky behaviour are less willing to pay higher premium 
policies and to stipulate an insurance contract. As a result, the insurance company mostly 
stipulates contracts with high-risk people: this is the effect of adverse selection.  
Moral hazard can be defined as the tendency of the better-informed party to exploit the 
asymmetric information in a dishonest way. In particular, moral hazard is the risk that a party 
of the transaction entered the contract not in good faith and gave misleading information 
regarding the object of the transaction, his liabilities or credit capacity. Moreover, the better-
informed party often is motivated to take unusual risks in order to earn profits before the 
contract is settled, and in doing so he negatively affects the other party. In this situation, 
decisions are not based on what is considered right but on what provides the highest level of 
profits: from this aspect derives the reference to morality. Getting back to the case of insurance 
contract, the transaction can also be affected by moral hazard. If people with high risk of getting 
sick do not mention such information during the stipulation of the contract, they get lower 
premium policies to pay. Moral hazard occurs because they are less motivated to take care of 
themselves due to the fact that if they get sick the insurance company will cover the expenses.   
In the context of asymmetric information, important argumentations were brought by Akerlof. 
In particular, in his study about The Market of “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism (1970), he argues that as a consequence of asymmetric information, the market of 
low-quality products, called “lemons”, crowds out the one of high-quality products. To 
illustrate and develop his thoughts, Akerlof took the market of used cars as an example. 
In the market of used cars sellers offer high-quality and low-quality cars. Potential buyers are 
not able to say whether or not a car is of good quality, before they have bought and driven it. 
Hence, sellers can decide to offer low-quality cars at higher prices to earn higher profits. At this 
point, sellers of high-quality cars are less effective in selling their products, because high-
quality cars are valued as much as the low-quality cars, and sellers would not receive the 
expected value for their products either. The majority of traded cars would be “lemons”, and 
high-quality cars may end up not be traded at all: the low-quality product tends to drive out the 
high-quality one (Akerlof, 1970).  
The “Lemons Problem” is the starting point to explain how do the processes of adverse selection 
and moral hazard act. In fact, a consequence of the mechanism explained above is that sellers 
of high-quality cars exit the market and only “lemons” are offered. The market of high-quality 
cars may eventually collapse, and the market of low-quality cars, characterised by inefficient 
transactions (bad cars sold at the price of good cars), would increase: this is an effect of the 
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adverse selection. Moreover, the presence in the market of people willing to offer low-quality 
cars at the price of high-quality ones represents the major cost of dishonesty. In fact, dishonest 
dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market. Hence, legitimate business would be 
driven out of existence - and this is an effect of the moral hazard (Akerlof, 1970). 
Even if does not lead to a bad product driving a good product out of the market in all of the 
cases, asymmetric information is a market failure that drives the parties involved in the 
economic transaction to an inefficient and undesirable outcome. This is the reason why potential 
buyers are motivated to find as much information regarding a specific good or service as 
possible. By definition, the dispersion of knowledge creates asymmetric information. Hence, 
what buyers ask for is mechanisms to coordinate this dispersed knowledge and reduce time and 
costs when looking for information. Markets and institutions should incentivize entrepreneurs 
who develop those mechanisms and help reducing the problem of asymmetric information 
(Thierer, Koopman, Hobson, Kuiper, 2016).  
The Sharing Economy, thanks to its high-performing and technologically-advanced online 
platforms, has developed and is still developing a series of mechanisms which help potential 
buyers finding as much information regarding a specific good or service as possible. In the next 
paragraph, I will analyse these mechanisms in detail. 
2.2 Which tools does the Sharing Economy use to reduce asymmetric 
information? 
The widespread presence of online sharing platforms is leading to a “private” market solution 
to the problem of asymmetric information, where “private” means that no intervention from 
public authorities is required. The information revolution, the development of online 
reputational and trust-building mechanisms, the lower search costs enabled by the 
interconnected world of the Internet, have motivated the new entrepreneurs in the scenario of 
the Sharing Economy to consider the asymmetric information not as a market failure, but rather 
as a market opportunity (Thierer, Koopman, Hobson, Kuiper, 2016).  
In fact, as already explained in the first chapter, online sharing platforms are born with the 
purpose of facilitating everyday activities (such as finding an accommodation for the holidays, 
a pet-sitter for the dog, and many others). This is the reason why reducing search costs and 
optimising the use of information are among the main characteristics which online sharing 
platforms base their businesses on. Considering that reducing search costs and optimising the 
use of information can drive to a reduction of disperse knowledge, it is possible to observe how 
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entrepreneurs operating in the scenario of the Sharing Economy exploit the asymmetric 
information, which characterised traditional markets, to establish their new businesses. That is 
to say, they see in this market failure a new market opportunity. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the reputational and feedback mechanisms created by 
online sharing platforms, it is important to underline that Sharing Economy’s markets are 
different from those of used cars or insurance contracts. On online sharing platforms 
transactions happen with a high frequency and vendor and consumer can interact more than 
once in a short time. These characteristics of the markets can be considered as another reason 
why entrepreneurs operating in the scenario of Sharing Economy develop reputational and 
feedback mechanisms. 
There are several mechanisms created by the online sharing platforms to facilitate the process 
of gaining information for their users. In the following section I will focus mainly on two of 
these mechanisms: reputational feedback and direct communication systems integrated in the 
platforms. 
One of the first mechanisms developed to reduce the asymmetric information is the reputational 
feedback mechanism. In the form of product or service ratings, reviews and awards, this 
mechanism existed in the traditional “offline” market too. With the advent of the Internet, it 
was simply moved online, leveraging a wider audience and continuing to lower the transaction 
costs associated with acquiring pertinent information. (Thierer, Koopman, Hobson, Kuiper, 
2016).  
Nowadays, with the rise of the Sharing Economy, the technology for reputational feedback 
mechanisms has reached a new advanced level. In general, we can determine two different types 
of online reputational mechanisms: centralized or third-party mechanisms and peer-to-peer 
mechanisms. 
Centralized or third-party mechanisms are built to reduce the asymmetric information between 
the users and the platform, and not necessarily between the two transacting parties. The aim of 
these mechanisms is to increase the level of knowledge and comfort in the transaction. In other 
words, the online sharing platforms act as third parties seeking to facilitate the connection 
between buyers and sellers and to add validity to the transaction. Examples of such mechanisms 
are guarantees and insurances provided by the platform to both parties of the transaction; vetting 
or scanning procedures to block questionable or untrustworthy users; investigations to ensure 
that only qualified users can offer certain services; payment clearing system; “Big Data” 
analytics. Guarantees and insurances lower the risk in the transaction for both parties, increase 
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the number of transactions made on the platform and enhance the platform’s brand. For 
example, Yescapa, an online sharing platform to rent campers, offers different kinds of 
insurance to both camper owners and people who want to rent a camper. Vetting or scanning 
procedures can take several forms. Lyft, an online ride-sharing platform, performs both criminal 
and driving background checks for every driver, to guarantee the safety of its users. They also 
confirm if the driver has a valid driving license and a personal insurance that meets State 
requirements. Mechanisms to ensure that only qualified users can offer certain services are 
provided, for example, by DogVacy a platform that connects dog owners with dog lovers who 
are willing to take care of them. This platform uses a system where potential dog hosts must 
have their profile approved before being listed as dog-sitters. Moreover, dog-sitters can improve 
their ranking results (and have higher probabilities of being hired by dog owners) by attending 
training sessions, where they have to read some texts or watch videos and then take tests; all 
offered by the platform itself. Payment clearing systems are one of the oldest methods used to 
facilitate transactions. In this case, the sharing platform verifies the payment between sellers 
and buyers, so that neither party has to worry about fraudulent payments. Furthermore, on the 
online sharing platforms cash payments are not allowed: this reduces even more fraud risks. 
“Big Data” analytics is a relatively new mechanism typical of online centralized platforms. This 
mechanism uses computer algorithms to monitor transactions and either flag or block as 
suspicious some activities. Any suspicious activity report is sent to a human employee to further 
investigate. Airbnb uses this type of system to track almost every element of a transaction 
(listing, profile, reservation, payment). For example, if hosts and guests repeatedly book an 
accommodation with each other or if a new user books a very expensive room with a new host, 
the system automatically flags these transactions as suspicious and the security team of the 
platform starts investigating.  
It is worth mentioning that the centralized mechanisms to reduce asymmetric information, as 
described above, work for two main reasons. The first is that a platform acting as a third-party 
is in fact a stakeholder in the transaction (and it gets a percentage on the value of the transaction 
too), therefore it has all the interests in avoiding any fraud and abuse. The second reason is that, 
in general, online sharing platform have better (financial) resources than private people, which 
means it is easier for online platforms to offer mechanisms to reduce asymmetric information 
(Thierer, Koopman, Hobson, Kuiper, 2016).  
Peer-to-peer mechanisms are developed with the aim of reducing the asymmetric information 
between the two parties of the transaction directly. There are various peer-to-peer feedback 
mechanisms. One of the most popular is the ratings and reviews system. These systems allow 
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the users to review the service or product they have rented, bought or experienced through the 
platform, to review the other party of the exchange and the overall experience provided by the 
platform at the end of the exchange as well. One of the most relevant characteristics of these 
ratings systems is that both ratings are automatically published on the rated users’ profiles. In 
this way, future potential buyers and sellers can find more information about the product or 
service and also about the other party of the exchange. The ratings and reviews systems vary 
from 5-stars or points ratings to detailed reviews. Getting back to the case of Lyft, the platform 
also uses a 5-stars ratings system that implies that a driver with an average rating below 4.6 is 
at risk of being deactivated from the platform. Another relevant procedure is the confirmation 
of a person’s identity through the creation of individual profiles. Every information that can 
confirm the identity of the other party reduces the asymmetric information between the parties, 
therefore the transaction is more likely to happen. This explains why online sharing platforms 
usually allow users to sign up with Facebook or other social media profiles, as these are most 
likely linked to the real identities. Platforms can also verify the users’ identities through their 
phone number, email or profile photo. Airbnb, for example, gives the host the possibility to ask 
their guests the “Verified ID Badge”, which means that the guest has to upload on his profile 
the scan of his driving license or his passport.  
Related to the topic of peer-to-peer feedback mechanisms, the research conducted by Ert, 
Fleischer and Magen (2016), on the role of personal photos in Airbnb is also interesting. Ert, 
Fleischer and Magen conducted two studies on how the choice of an accommodation on Airbnb 
relies on the visual-based trust, which means how the choice relies on the trustworthiness 
perceived by viewing the host’s profile picture, rather than on host’s reviews. In particular, 
Study 1 was designed to evaluate whether or not visual-based trust affects prices of Airbnb 
listings. The authors focused only on listings that were reviewed, since reviews are the only 
indication available that accommodations have been rented out. They recorded all the attribute 
variables of these listings, including price, number and average score of reviews, nature of 
accommodation, numbers of rooms, host’s gender and profile pictures. In Study 2, instead, Ert, 
Fleischer and Magen tested the relationship between visual-based trust and the choice of listings 
under two different conditions. In the first experiment (Study 2.1), they held the reviews score 
at their highest level and similar to the one found in Study 1. In the second experiment (Study 
2.2), they artificially varied the reviews scores in order to evaluate whether or not such variation 
would alter the effect of visual-based trust on the listing choice. Particularly interesting for my 
analysis are the results of the Study 1. “The results reveal a significant positive effect of the 
perceived trustworthiness of the host according to her photo on listing price. Specifically, an 
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increase in one unit of the visual-based trust score (scale of ten) leads to an increase of 
approximately seven percent in the price of the listing.” (Ert, Fleischer, Magen, pp. 15-17, 
2015). In this case, it seems that the role of the profile picture is important not only because it 
reduces the asymmetric information between the two parties of the transaction, but also because 
it increases the value of the exchange. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph, another important mechanism created by 
online sharing platforms to reduce asymmetric information is the direct communication system 
integrated in the platforms; that is to say, online chats where the two parties can have a direct 
exchange of information. Airbnb, for example, integrated a system of direct communication in 
its platform that allows guests and hosts to get in touch with each other even before the 
accommodation is booked. Even though direct communication systems seem to be part of the 
peer-to-peer mechanisms category, in my opinion they represent a good compromise between 
a centralized and a peer-to-peer mechanism. In fact, when a platform decides to integrate a 
system of direct communication, it achieves the objective of reducing asymmetric information 
in two perspectives. The first one is a peer-to-peer perspective: giving the two parties of the 
transaction the possibility of a direct communication, the platform allows the two parties to 
better align on the information they need for the exchange. The second is a third-party 
perspective: a platform that allows its users to have a direct communication between each other 
makes them feel secure about the validity of the transaction and satisfied with the overall service 
provided by the platform. 
It is important to note that, just as different situations call for different mechanisms, so different 
online sharing transactions call for different reputational and feedback mechanisms. The nature 
of the exchange establishes which system is most suited. People may not need detailed 
information to hire someone to mow the lawn, but they would certainly seek out more 
information if they have to hire a baby-sitter for their children. Whether a platform uses a 
centralized or a peer-to-peer mechanism, what counts the most is that it is able to free its users 
from spending time and effort looking for specific information, thus reducing asymmetric 
information between the two parties of the transaction. 
2.3 The improvement reached by the Sharing Economy: Users’ Trust 
After this short analysis of which tools the Sharing Economy offers to reduce the asymmetric 
information, one point still needs to be clarified. Are these tools really effective? Do they 
effectively reduce this market failure? To answer these questions, it is necessary to analyse the 
results reached by these mechanisms.  
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One of the most relevant results reached by the reputational and feedback mechanisms, 
developed by the online sharing platforms, is the users’ trust. Centralized mechanisms increase 
trust between the users and the platform by making sure that the transaction happens in a secure 
and valid environment; while peer-to-peer mechanisms increase trust between the two 
transacting parties by allowing them to align on the information they need for the exchange.  
Trust is particularly relevant in the case of the Sharing Economy because transactions mainly 
happen through strangers. Users of online sharing platforms usually do not know each other 
before they get in touch on the platform; nor they have the time to deepen their acquaintance 
before the transaction takes place. This is the reason why gaining users’ trust through 
reputational and feedback mechanisms is fundamental for the transaction to happen. Therefore, 
the more an online sharing platform reduces the cost of the information research for its users, 
the more users trust the process and the other party. Hence, the number of transactions occurring 
on the platform increases and the value generated by the platform increases too. Moreover, the 
concept of “sharing” is strictly related to the concept of “trust”. People do not share goods, 
assets or knowledge with each other if they do not trust the other party and the overall process. 
Hence, trust plays a crucial role in the Sharing Economy. 
Particularly relevant for the online sharing platforms is the study of Lu, Zhao and Wang “From 
virtual community members to C2C e-commerce buyers: Trust in virtual communities and its 
effect on consumers’ purchase intention” (2010). In their research, Lu Zhao and Wang 
differentiated between the constructs of trust in members and of trust in the website; then both 
constructs were separated into three dimensions: ability, integrity and benevolence. What they 
found is that community members’ trustworthiness influences purchase intentions. As C2C e-
commerce businesses can be approximately compared to online sharing platforms (in both cases 
there is an exchange between peers), it is possible to consider these results as valid for the 
Sharing Economy too. In particular, the distinction between trust in members and trust in the 
website can be compared to the distinction between peer-to-peer and third-party reputational 
mechanisms, which online sharing platforms use to reach users’ trust. In fact, online sharing 
platforms, thanks to peer-to-peer mechanisms, make users trust each other (trust in members), 
and thanks to third-party mechanisms, they gain users’ trust in the process (trust in the website).  
In confirmation of this comparison, there is the study “Trust in Sharing Economy” of 
Hawlitschek, Teubner and Weinhardt (2016). Their objective was to describe how users’ trust 
influences the transactions on online sharing platforms. In particular, Hawlitschek, Teubner and 
Weinhardt differentiated between two perspectives, the one of consumers and the one of 
suppliers and they also determined three different targets of trust, which they called 3P: trust 
25 
 
towards peers, towards products and towards platform. As Lu, Zhao and Wang did, 
Hawlitschek, Teubner and Weinhardt also represented the three different trust targets in the 
three dimensions of ability, integrity and benevolence. From a consumer’s perspective, trust in 
peers describes whether or not the supplier is able to execute his part of the transaction and if 
he is considered a partner of integrity and benevolence. Trust in the platform is based on the 
beliefs about ability, integrity and benevolence of the website as a mediator in the transaction. 
Trust in the product describes how much a product (or service) is considered reliable for 
potential customers. Instead, from the supplier’s perspective, trust in peers describes how much 
the supplier can rely on the customer regarding payments (ability of executing his part of the 
transaction), potential damages (integrity) and meeting supplier’s interests (benevolence). Trust 
in the platform describes its ability, integrity and benevolence in providing a seamless 
communication and a smooth service. Here, trust in the product from the supplier’s perspective 
is not considered as relevant, since the supplier is usually the owner of the product. 
Hawlitschek, Teubner and Weinhardt conducted online surveys as method of research and, from 
the analysis of the data obtained through the surveys, they found that trust in peers, product and 
platform, from both supplier and consumer’s perspective, positively affected the intentions to 
provide and consume respectively. Unlike traditional B2B e-commerce, online sharing 
platforms themselves need to appear trustworthy and they also have to manage users’ 
perceptions of each other and of the object of the exchange, in order to generate (and increase) 
their businesses (Hawlitschek, Teubner, Weinhardt 2016). 
The findings of both the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph are particularly important, 
because they confirm users’ trust as one of the most relevant results reached by the Sharing 
Economy: without the users’ trust, the Sharing Economy cannot generate business. Therefore, 
it is possible to consider user’s trust as a valid tool to measure the effectiveness of reputational 
and feedback mechanisms implemented by online sharing platforms. In particular, a 
reputational mechanism capable of generating trust implies that the platform using that 
mechanism can reduce the asymmetric information within the transaction. Hence, it is possible 
to conclude that user’s trust can indicate whether or not online sharing platforms can reduce 
asymmetric information.  
A platform capable of obtaining users’ trust generates more transactions and higher revenues. 
Therefore, the number of transactions can be considered as a relevant indicator of the trust and, 
consequently, of the reduced asymmetric information reached by the online sharing platforms. 
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As mentioned in the introduction, platforms like Airbnb and Uber have now become established 
businesses with high revenues and a strong brand identity. They both have integrated 
reputational and feedback mechanisms into their platforms. Airbnb implements both centralized 
and peer-to-peer mechanisms. Some of these procedures were already mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. In addition to the ones cited before, Airbnb offers other centralized 
mechanisms, such as a secure payment system on the platform, and other peer-to-peer 
mechanisms, such as the verification of the account every time the user logs into the profile 
from a different device, plus a direct communication system integrated in the website and in 
the app. The platform developed by Brian Chesky in 2008 has seen a huge increase in the 
number of bookings; in particular, Figure 2 shows the growth in terms of number of nights 
booked from 2011 (year in which Airbnb reached 1 million bookings) to 2015. 
Figure 2: Nights Booked on Airbnb 
 
(Source: Boston Hospitality Review, http://www.bu.edu/bhr/2016/01/08/the-making-of-airbnb/ ) 
Uber offers both centralized and peer-to-peer reputational mechanisms too. Its 24/7 incident 
support and GPS tracking of all the rides are examples of centralized mechanisms; while the 2-
way ratings system and the possibility for Uber users to share their trips with other users are 
examples of peer-to-peer mechanisms. The ride-sharing platform from San Francisco is 
registering an increasing number of rides; in particular, Figure 3 shows the number of gross 
bookings on Uber per quarter, from July 2016 to June 2018. 
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Figure 3: Uber’s Global Quarterly Gross Bookings 
 
(Source: Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.de/ubers-losses-grow-in-q3-but-bookings-rise-2017-
12?r=US&IR=T) 
Uber and Airbnb are examples of successful online sharing platforms. Thanks to the strong 
brand identity they have reached in the sectors of transportation and accommodation 
respectively, it is safe to assume that their increasing number of transactions is now mostly due 
to their brand image, rather than to their ability to reduce asymmetric information. In the case 
of online sharing platforms with a strong brand identity, it is more difficult to find an immediate 
correlation between the number of transactions and the reduced asymmetric information. For 
established brands like Airbnb or Uber, one can safely assume that transactions are carried out 
because users are rather attracted to the brand image of the platform, than the platform’s ability 
to reduce the disperse knowledge. Considering how relevant the brand image is in the number 
of transactions of an online sharing platform, I chose to develop the case study of listnride, a 
young but fast-growing start-up from Berlin operating in the market of bike-sharing. listnride 
was first launched in the market in October 2016. Considering its still recent launch, the brand 
image of this bike-sharing platform is not yet established in a way that can affect the number 
of transactions. This is the reason why I chose listnride to analyse if the Sharing Economy can 
actually provide a solution to the problem of asymmetric information.  
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Chapter 3: The case study of listnride 
3.1 An overview of the Bike-Sharing Market  
Before proceeding with the case study of listnride, I will present a short overview of the bike-
sharing market in order to better understand in which sector of the Sharing Economy listnride 
operates.  
Until now, the businesses developed in the scenario of the Sharing Economy have been 
presented only as online businesses. But this is not always the case. Some sectors which provide 
everyday-life services have been affected by the rise of the Sharing Economy even though their 
businesses were not moved to high-end or sophisticated online platforms. In particular, the 
sector of public transportation has been further enhanced thanks to new managing systems. For 
example, in the case of the bike-sharing market, new sophisticated managing systems allow the 
use of shared bicycles within a pre-set area.  Nowadays, in most of the largest metropolitan 
areas in Europe, North America and East Asia, people have the possibility to use shared bicycles 
to move around the city. They can pick up the bike from a specific station, usually called 
“docking station”, and return it on a different station. Bikes are locked at the docking stations 
and can be unlocked only with specific codes or cards. The bike-sharing systems offer to the 
citizens of a certain area a new, flexible and eco-sustainable mean of transportation. Thanks to 
their environmentally friendly characteristic, bike-sharing systems have been increasing their 
presence worldwide in the past years.  
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Figure 4: The Global Rise of Bike-Sharing 
(Source: Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.de/the-bike-sharing-market-is-growing-charts-2018-
4?r=UK&IR=T) 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the sector of public transportation has been largely affected by the rise 
of the Sharing Economy. The number of shared bicycles has almost doubled from 2013 to 2015. 
Important environmental factors contributed to the growth of the bike-sharing systems. The air 
pollution is one of the most relevant factors. As a consequence of the increase of air pollution, 
countries started to develop initiatives to reduce the car use in the cities and incentive people to 
use public transport. It is not by chance that China, the third country most affected by air 
pollution, was the first country by number of public-use bike-sharing systems in 2016. As a 
matter of fact, cities which adopted urban mobility policies to promote cycling, and limit car 
use, represent the main scenario for the development of bike-sharing systems.  
A bike-sharing system is characterised by four main elements: bicycles, docking stations, IT 
system and depots. First, bicycles are the most important part of a bike-sharing system. They 
must be versatile and provide flexibility along with the ease of use. Shared bicycles should be 
designed in order to be used by people of different ages, gender, size and economic class. 
Moreover, the bike design should have an identity that represents the bike-sharing system and 
makes the bike recognisable for the citizens or tourists who want to use the service. Then, 
docking stations have to be located in strategic areas of the city, in order to meet the 
transportation needs of the citizens. They usually have an open structure so that they can be 
moved from a location to another in case needed. Docking stations are provided with docks, a 
shelter and a terminal where people can pay for the bike-sharing service. The IT system is 
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required to manage the GPS or RFID trackers installed on the bicycles and to manage the 
transactions occurring on the terminals as well. It is also needed as a control and fare-
management system and to administer the website of the bike-sharing service, its mobile App 
and the SMS-based information network. Finally, depots are spots where bicycles are kept 
while they are not in service. They are provided with all the equipment to manage, repair and 
clean the bikes. 
There is a variety of business models that can be adopted to implement a bike-sharing system 
in a metropolitan area. The main difference between each business model lies on the provider 
of the service. The provider can be an advertising company, a local authority or a public 
transport operator. In the first case, the advertising company provides the bikes and manages 
the sharing system in exchange for advertising rights. For example, the bike-sharing system in 
Paris, Velib, is provided by Smovengo, an international private firm which offers urban mobility 
solutions. In the second case, local authorities design, own and operate a system by themselves 
or contract providers to install and operate a system for free. The first option was adopted by 
the Municipality of Ahrus (Denmark), which provides its own bike-sharing system called 
Aarhus Bycykel. In the third case, the public transport operator provides a bike-sharing system 
to enhance its services. This is the case of Call a bike, a bike-sharing system offered by 
Deutsche Bahn all over Germany. Another important difference between different bike-sharing 
systems is that some of them are for-profit businesses, some others are non-profit businesses. 
In the former case, the provider offers the system for profit and with minimal involvement of 
local authorities; in the latter case, the provider offers the system for free with the support of 
local authorities. 
After this short presentation of the main characteristics of a bike-sharing system, it is interesting 
to analyse which are the strengths and weaknesses of the bike-sharing market. Shared bicycles 
are an environmentally friendly mean of transport offered at a low price, suitable for people of 
different ages and flexible to different uses. At the same time, shared bicycles can be easily 
damaged or stolen and docking stations have to be located in very strategic points, in order to 
offer an effective bike-sharing network in a city. Moreover, offering a bike-sharing service at a 
low price requires high investments from the provider’s side. Considering these strengths and 
weaknesses, the bike-sharing market is facing great opportunities, such as the possibility of 
reducing the CO2 emission in cities while providing an eco-sustainable mean of transport; but 
at the same time, this market has to overcome some threats, such as the difficulty of motivating 
people to use bicycles instead of cars. In fact, as the case of Uber (paragraph 2.3) shows, also 
the car-sharing is a growing market in the scenario of the Sharing Economy. 
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This overview of the bike-sharing market will be helpful for the analysis of the case study of 
listnride in the following paragraphs.  
3.2 listnride: the “Airbnb for bicycles” 
listnride is a young bike-sharing company from Berlin, that operates in the market of bike-
sharing with a business model which is different from the ones presented in the previous 
paragraph. As the company itself defines its business, listnride is the “Airbnb for bicycles”. 
This definition reflects the first purpose with which listnride was created: give to private people 
the possibility to share their bicycles with others through an online platform, as Airbnb does 
with the accommodation. 
listnride co-founders Johannes Stuhler and Gert-Jan Van Wijk wanted to create an online 
community of bike-lovers, where people could share their bikes and their love for cycling with 
others. They also wanted to make bikes available everywhere at any time. Johannes and Gert-
Jan first met in 2012 during their master studies in Mannheim and immediately discovered that 
both had a great passion for cycling. After their studies, they focused on the idea of creating an 
online bike-sharing community. In October 2016, listnride was first launched in the market. 
Initially, the platform was conceived for private people only. As the name suggests, on listnride 
people can list and rent bikes. People who register on listnride to list one or more of their bikes 
are called listers. They simply have to add a short description, a couple of nice pictures and the 
location of their bikes, and set the rental price. After this short process their bikes are available 
to be rented on the platform. People who register on listnride to rent a bike are called riders. 
Riders can look for a bike through the search per location and search results will show all the 
bikes available in that location. Results can also be filtered per bike category, brand, timespan 
or size. Once people find a bike that fits their needs, they can request that bike. The booking 
process ends only when the lister accepts the request from the rider. At this point, the bike is 
booked and both parties receive a confirmation email. One important aspect is that, as for other 
online sharing platforms, also on listnride users do not have to register as listers or riders only. 
They can be both at different times. Figure 5 shows in detail how listnride structured its business 
and revenues model. 
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Figure 5: Business and Revenue Model of listnride 
 
(Source: on concession of listnride) 
 
From October 2016 until now, listnride has broadened its service. In particular, it started 
offering its service to other two operators in the market of bike rental: bike shops and bike 
brands. In fact, from October 2017 listnride offers also to bike shops the possibility to list their 
bikes on the platform. The listing process is the same as the one seen for private people. 
Moreover, from January 2018 listnride collaborates with bike brands to offer a test-ride service. 
This service is meant to give to potential customers the possibility to test the bike before buying 
it. A lot of brands, especially e-bikes producers, sell their expensive products online and this 
makes it harder for customers to decide on the purchase. For this reason, listnride decided to 
offer bike brands the possibility to list some of their bikes on the platform. For each brand there 
is a dedicated page on the listnride website, where people can find relevant information on the 
bikes and the location where they are available for a test ride. The booking process for test-ride 
bikes is the same.  
As mentioned above, the business model of listnride is different from the typical bike-sharing 
system and more similar to the business model of Airbnb. The two platforms are similar not 
only in the way they offer their service, but also in the way they generate their revenues, because 
listnride too charges a service fee to both parties of the transaction. 
Offering a bike-sharing service only through an online platform has clear advantages. The first 
is that offering a bike-sharing service online gives to the provider the possibility to reach out to 
a greater number of people. The typical bike-sharing services can only be used by the citizens 
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or tourists of a specific city or area; whereas listnride instead can potentially offers its service 
worldwide. As for now, this young bike-sharing service is present in Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, UK and South Africa and the platform is 
available in five languages (German, English, Dutch, Italian and Spanish); but listnride is 
growing faster and reaching new locations every day. The second advantage of offering the 
bike-sharing service only online is that an online bike-sharing service does not have to supply 
the bikes directly and it does not have to manage the placement of docking stations in strategic 
points. listnride offers to the listers the possibility of making their bikes available for rent and 
to the riders the possibility to find a rental bike, but the supply and availability of bikes does 
not depend on listnride itself. This way, listnride can also offer a wider variety of bikes for 
rental. In fact, on the platform not only classic city bikes are available for rent, but one can find 
road and gravel bikes, MTBs, e-bikes, cargo bike and folding bikes too. A third advantage of 
offering the bike-sharing service only online is the reduced risk of damages and thefts. With 
typical bike-sharing services people often do not have to identify through a registration process 
and the IT system does not keep track of all the rides. These characteristics make it easier to 
damage or steal bikes without the risk of being caught. On listnride, people have to register in 
order to list or rent a bike, making it is easier to keep track of the rented bikes, to identify who 
rented them and to reduce the risk of damages and thefts. 
From the analysis above, it emerges that listnride developed a new business model for the bike-
sharing market and it has also improved the way the bike-sharing service is provided. Bringing 
online a service traditionally provided offline and reducing some of its weaknesses is not 
sufficient to reach the conclusion that an online sharing platform has reduced the asymmetric 
information between vendors and consumers. For this reason, it is necessary to analyse which 
tools listnride uses to reduce the disperse knowledge and to verify if these tools are effective.  
3.3 How listnride increases Users’ Trust 
As many other online sharing platforms, listnride bases its business on reducing the search costs 
for its users and optimising the use of information. The bike-sharing company helps riders to 
find a rental bike that fits their needs, and listers to find a person willing to rent their bikes. In 
short, listnride helps the two parties finding the best match for the transaction. To do so, it 
implements various reputational and feedback mechanisms which help both rider and lister in 
gaining more information about the other party and the transaction itself. The analysis of the 
reputational and feedback mechanisms implemented by listnride and their effectiveness will 
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outline if this bike-sharing company can reduce the asymmetric information between vendors 
and consumers. 
listnride uses third-party and peer-to-peer mechanisms in order to facilitate the process of 
gaining information for its users. The third-party mechanisms implemented on the platform are: 
the verification of the payment method, the acceptance of listnride Terms and Conditions and 
the insurance. The verification of the payment method protects the users against fraud. listnride 
checks through an automatic process that every user provides a valid payment method: if the 
payment data provided is not valid or there is not enough credit available, the booking system 
does not allow the lister to accept the request and book the bike. As a consequence, the 
transaction does not happen in such cases. Moreover, offline or cash payments are not allowed 
on listnride. The acceptance of listnride Terms and Conditions is a required step for the users 
in order to register on the platform. Users must be aware of the fact that, when they reach a 
rental agreement on the platform, this has to be in line with listnride statements. Terms and 
Conditions are available for free download on the platform. Since July 2018, listnride also 
offers an insurance cover for all the rentals in Germany and Austria. During the request process 
a basic insurance is added per default to the rental price. With the basic insurance riders are 
protected against unintentional or third-party damages, vandalism and damages to the 
electronics in case of e-bikes rentals. Riders also have the possibility to choose a premium 
insurance which protects them in case of thefts, includes a return transport or bike replacement 
and a 24/7 emergency service in case of damages or thefts. Listers, on their side, have to 
estimate the value of their bikes when they list them. This information establishes the value of 
the basic insurance for each bike. The insurance cover is valid for the rental period only and 
both parties receive the insurance contract in the booking-confirmation email. The insurance 
listnride offers protects both parties of the transaction and makes them feel more secure when 
they agree on a rental, which is a great tool to gain users’ trust. 
The peer-to-peer mechanisms implemented by listnride are: the verification of the profile, the 
possibility to register and log in with a Facebook profile and the ratings system. The verification 
of the profile consists on proving that a user’s email address or phone number are actually 
existing. To verify their email address or phone number, users have to enter a specific code 
received by email or SMS notification during the registration process. This procedure helps the 
platform to guarantee to both parties of the transaction that they are dealing with a real person. 
Moreover, on listnride it is not possible to register more than once using the same email address 
or phone number. If this happens, after the registration it is not possible to proceed with listing 
or requesting a bike. Registering and logging in with their Facebook profile is another tool that 
35 
 
makes the users rely on the fact that they are dealing with real persons, since Facebook profiles 
are usually connected to real identities. It is worth mentioning at this point that listnride asks 
its users to upload a profile picture too, in order to make their profiles more reliable and increase 
their possibility of renting a bike or renting out their bikes. As for now, uploading a profile 
picture is not a required step in the registration process on listnride, hence it cannot be 
considered as a peer-to-peer reputational mechanism. The rating system, instead, is fully 
integrated on the platform and listnride considers it as one of the most important procedures to 
help the two parties to learn a little more about each other before proceeding with the rental 
agreement. After every rental, the lister is asked to confirm the return of the bike in order to 
conclude the process and receive the payout. To complete the confirmation process, the lister 
has to rate the rider through both a 5-stars rating system and a detailed review. Once the lister 
has confirmed the return of the bike, the rider is asked to rate the lister with the same systems. 
Both rider and lister receive reminders about rating the other party. The most important 
characteristic of this rating system is that both ratings are published on the users’ profiles. This 
way other users can find more information regarding a specific lister or rider. 
There is another important tool worth mentioning, before concluding the analysis of the 
reputational and feedback mechanisms implemented by listnride: the online chat. listnride gives 
its users the possibility to have a direct communication even before the bike is booked. When 
riders request a bike, the platform automatically opens an online chat with the lister where 
riders can ask for more information regarding the bike and discuss pick-up and return 
arrangements. At this stage of the booking process the bike is not booked yet. If the riders are 
not satisfied with the information received from the lister, they are still on time to cancel their 
request without costs. The integrated online chat is a fundamental tool in order to reduce the 
riders’ lack of knowledge on the object of the exchange and to make them trust the booking 
process.  
To complete the analysis of the reputational and feedback procedures mentioned above, it is 
necessary to verify their effectiveness. As explained in the previous chapter, the number of 
transactions is a relevant indicator of the effectiveness of third-party and peer-to-peer 
mechanisms, implemented by online sharing platforms, in order to reduce the asymmetric 
information between vendors and consumers. In particular, an increase in the number of 
transactions suggests a positive effect of the reputational and feedback procedures on reducing 
the asymmetric information.  
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Figure 6 shows the quarterly percentage of growth in the number of transactions on listnride 
from 2017 to 2018. Since details for 2018 are not available yet, the last quarter of the year (Q4) 
is not considered in this graphic. 
Figure 6: Quarterly Rentals’ Growth on listnride 
 
(Source: on concession of listnride) 
The number of quarterly transactions on listnride highly increased from 2017 to 2018. This 
growth can be partly due to the rise of the bike-sharing sector pointed out in Figure 4. But 
listnride’s service has two unique characteristics which makes it stand out on the scenario of 
bike-sharing. The first characteristic is the great variety of bikes offered on the platform, 
especially of road and gravel bikes, e-bikes and cargo bikes which are usually difficult to find 
for rent online at competitive prices. The second characteristic is the test-ride program, 
something completely new in the scenario of bike-sharing and not offered from any other online 
bike-rental service before. The uniqueness of the service offered by listnride suggests that the 
success of its business is rather due to the effectiveness of its reputational and feedback 
mechanisms than to the general rise of the bike-sharing sector. Hence, it is possible to affirm 
that listnride effectively reduces the asymmetric information between vendors and consumers. 
Considering the young age of the platform, listnride can still improve its reputational and 
feedback procedures in order to achieve better results. In particular, two of the procedures 
mentioned above can be better implemented on the platform. The insurance could be extended 
to all the rentals booked on the platform, and not only to the ones that take place in Germany 
and Austria. listnride is already working on this; but considering the different countries where 
listnride service is offered and the different regulations which characterise the different 
countries, this is not an easy process. The ratings system, instead, can be improved in a way 
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that makes this process shorter, because now, especially for the listers, the rating process 
requires quite a long time. Considering that listnride has started offering the possibility of listing 
bikes also to professional listers (such as bike shops and bike brands), it would be a good idea 
to change the current rating methods. A possibility could be removing the detailed reviews and 
change the 5-stars rating into a system where users have to give a 5-stars rating to different 
categories, such as the bike the other party the booking process and the overall experience. 
Moreover, as it is now for listers, the rating process can be integrated as a required step also for 
the riders in order to finalise the rental. This way both parties have to rate the other, and the 
probability of having users without ratings on the platform gets down. 
Even if listnride can still improve its reputational and feedback mechanisms, what counts the 
most is that it seems clear that these procedures are already effectively reducing the asymmetric 
information between listers and riders. 
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Conclusions 
Nowadays the Sharing Economy has become a global phenomenon, affecting everyday new 
economic sector. The main reason of its success lies on the fact that the Sharing Economy offers 
simple and cheap solutions to everyday situations. The evidence of this can be found on the 
number of online sharing platforms’ users which is constantly growing.  
Considering that the main scenario of this new economic model is online, sharing platforms 
need to generate trust between users in order to establish a successful business. Generating trust 
means reducing the asymmetric information between the two parties of a transaction, usually 
vendor and consumer. Online sharing platforms develop reputational and feedback mechanisms 
to reduce the asymmetric information between users (peer-to-peer mechanisms) and between 
users and the platform (third party mechanisms). A valid measure of the effectiveness of these 
procedures is the number of transactions occurred on the platform. A growth on the number of 
transactions suggests that the platform is successfully reducing the asymmetric information. 
As the case study of listnride shows, online sharing platforms can effectively reduce the 
asymmetric information between vendors and consumers. Thanks to the implementation of 
reputational and feedback mechanisms, these platforms increase the trust between the two 
parties of the transaction and the trust of the users on the platform itself. Reaching users’ trust 
can thus be considered as a required step in order to effectively reduce the asymmetric 
information. 
Online sharing platforms should value the implementation of reputational and feedback 
mechanisms as a fundamental feature in order to reduce the asymmetric information between 
vendors and consumers, and thus generate revenues. In the online world, trust is necessary to 
make the transaction happen. As a matter of fact, online sharing platform that effectively deploy 
reputational and feedback procedures increase the number of transactions and thus their 
revenues. After these considerations, it is possible to say that online sharing platforms not only 
can but also have to reduce the information failure in order to generate a strong business and 
establish their presence on the market.  
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